华盛顿邮报文摘 | 为什么美国永远不会有高铁

Why the United States Will Never Have High-Speed Rail

  • Megan McArdle

California likes to think of itself as the state where the future happens, and in 2008, its voters decided the future was high-speed rail. In November of that year, they approved a $9 billion bond issue to begin one of the most ambitious government infrastructure projects in U.S. history: a bullet train connecting San Francisco and Los Angeles, at a cost of $33 billion.

For years, the optimists have spun starry visions of millions of Californians traveling quickly, comfortably and environmentally consciously between the state's two major population centers. The pessimists, meanwhile, have grimly watched the projected costs mount. At last count, the estimates had traveled northward of $75 billion, and for all anyone could tell, were still climbing.

On Tuesday, during his first State of the State speech, Gov. Gavin Newsom (D) called for the state to scale back the project to a less costly leg that would run through the Central Valley. California voters can stop clutching their wallets. But voters elsewhere should pay close attention, because what happened in California illustrates the perils that face any U.S. rail project, or for that matter, any project at all that tries to meaningfully reshape U.S. infrastructure.

Distance. In other places of the world, major population centers are much closer to each other. And big cities that are reasonably close together is pretty much a prerequisite for high-speed rail, which is why they have it and we don't. Imagine what it would take to build a line from New York City to Los Angeles — or to Chicago, Houston or Phoenix.

Wealth. Of course, the United States does have a few clusters that look ripe for rail. And instead of high-speed rail between these cities, we have the Acela, which takes eight hours to travel from Washington to Boston and shakes like a maraca player. Why haven't we built something better? Because truly high-speed rail needs to travel in a fairly straight line; you don't want to be taking a sharp curve at 300 miles per hour. Building newer, better, straighter rail lines would require the government to buy all the land between Point A and Point B and tear down anything that happened to be in the way. Because we're already really, really rich, what's between Point A and Point B is no longer farmland; instead we have a great deal of highly valuable real estate that will be very expensive to purchase.

Legal Proceduralism. For historical reasons, the U.S. legal system offers citizens an unparalleled number of veto points at which they can attempt to block government projects. Any infrastructure project bigger than painting a schoolhouse thus has to either fight out the reviews and court cases for years, or buy off the opponents, or more likely, both.
【法律程序主义】 由于历史原因,美国的法律体系向公民提供了数量绝无仅有、可以用来阻挠政府项目的否决点。因此,任何比粉刷校舍更大规模的基础设施项目都不得不通过多年的评估和法庭诉讼争出个结果,或者花钱收买反对者,或者更有可能双管齐下。

Cost. U.S. infrastructure projects cost way more to build than they do everywhere else. The right likes to blame unions; the left likes to blame pricey consultants. But they're all arguing about the symptom rather than the disease.
【成本】 美国基础设施项目的建设成本比其他任何地方都高得多。右派喜欢指责工会;“左派”喜欢指责要价过高的顾问。但他们都在争论症状而不是症结。

California displays all these pathologies with a vengeance. The part of the rail line that was reasonably cheap to build didn't go anywhere near where the people were; it ran through the Central Valley where land was reasonably cheap and the lobbies were relatively few. The parts of the line that were actually useful — the endpoints — promised endless legal and political headaches and astronomical costs. And those two endpoints were 400 miles apart — too far, in the end, to be reached.